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Reconsideration of Failure Initiating Mechanisms for
Teton Dam*
G. A. leonards
Professor of Civil Engineering, School of Civil Engineering, Purdue University,
West lafayette, Indiana

l. W. Davidson
Supervisory Civil Engineer, Embankment Dams Branch, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado

SYNOPSIS A review of failure mechanisms previously suggested for Teton Dam indicated that they were
not fully supported by all the available data. The original mechanisms are reviewed and a failure
initiation mechanism is then proposed which does satisfy all the available data, and laboratory
tests supporting this mechanism are presented. Additional lessons to be learned from the failure
are listed.
INTRODUCTION

more reliably and at less cost. For these
reasons, it is important to identify correctly
the mechanisms that initiated failure.

Teton Dam failed on June 5, 1976. It was the
first failure in the Bureau of Reclamation's
74-year history of dam construction. It was
the highest embankment dam that had ever failed
catastrophically in the entire history of earth
dam construction. These facts suggest that a
unique combination of factors was responsible
for the demise of the dam, and that full
understanding of the mechanism of failure may
make an important contribution to the
state-of-the-art.

The paper reviews the likely failure mechanisms
postulated in previous publications with particular attention to their evolution, and to
the progressive enlargement of the lessons
learned therefrom. Two new failure initiating
mechanisms were reported by the IRG in 1980 and
four additional mechanisms were advanced by
Seed and Duncan in 1982. In our opinion, none
of the failure mechanisms previously postulated
are fully supported by all of the existing
data. Accordingly, a failure mechanism is proposed which stands up to such scrutiny and the
results of experiments, specially designed to
test its validity, are reported. In conclusion, new lessons are added to the existing
list, which have important implications for
improving earth dam design and construction
practices.

The failure was investigated officially by two
groups, the Independent Panel ( IP) and the
Interior Review Group (IRG). The IP was composed of nine engineers of international repute
who completed their investigation and published
a report of remarkable quality in the short time
of 6 months (IP, 1976). The IRG was composed of
representatives from five Federal agencies concerned with dam construction; they published two
reports, one in April 1977 (IRG, 1977) and
another in January lg8o (IRG, 1980), the latter
report following extensive excavations at the
left abutment of the dam. A review of the findings given in these three reports, and a
reanalysis of the factors involved, was presented at the X Intern. Conf. SMFE in 1981 and
published in Proceedings (Seed and Duncan,
1982). Why, then, yet another review of this
failure?

REVIEW OF PLAUSIBLE FAILURE MECHANISMS
General Considerations
It is not feasible, nor is it necessary to present herein details of the site conditions, of
the design features and the dam configuration
adopted, and of the sequence of events preceding failure, as an excellent summary of all
these facets is readily available (Seed and
Duncan, 1982). However, for general reference,
a plan and a profile along the dam axis is
shown in Fig. 1. In particular, the geometric
similarity of the key trenches in the abutments
is noted. From the location where muddy water
was first observed to emerge on the downstream
face of the dam, from the pattern in which the
failure progressed, and from the location of
the whirlpool that developed in the reservoir
prior to breaching, it can be deduced that
failure was initiated in the key trench near
Sta. 14+00 and approximately at El. 5200.

Teton Dam was breached very rapidly before the
reservoir level reached the spillway sill on
first filling. It is agreed that plugging of
open joints ·in the bedrock, and filtering of
the zone 1 core material should have been provided for, and that great care should have been
taken in the construction of these design
features. However, there is little agreement
on the mechanism(s) that initiated the failure;
hence, it is not certain that these measures
would necessarily have prevented the failure
from occurring. Moreover, if the actual mechanism of failure were understood, protection
against future failures might be accomplished

*Opinions expressed in this paper are solely those
of the authors and do not reflect those of the
Bureau of Reclamation.
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Findings of the Independent Panel (1976)
The IP concluded that the triggering mechanisms
most likely to have led to the failure were:
" . . . the flow of water aginst the
highly erodible and unprotected key trench
filling, through joints in the unsealed rock
immediately beneath the grout cap near
Station 14+00 and the conseq~ent development
of an erosion tunnel across the base of the
key trench fill."

1.
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and
2.
. . . cracking caused by differential
strains or hydraulic fracturing of the core
material filling the key trench. This
cracking could also result in channels
through the key trench fill which would permit rapid internal erosion."
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The Panel noted that their description of the
failure mechanism did not provide a final
answer to the specific cause of failure, but
they did conclude that the choice was between
"
.imperfect grouting of the rock below the
grout cap, or cracking in the key trench fill
[near Sta. 14+00], or possibly both."
Although the grout curtain was. installed in a
workmanlike manner, there is no doubt that flow
could occur below the grout cap through open
joints in the rock and "windows" in the grout
curtain. However, for piping to be initiated
from the bottom of the key trench fill to
create an erosion tunnel across the base of the
trench (IP, 1977, Fig. 12-4, p. 12-8), there
must have been open joints at the base of the
key trench.
--

STATION
*LOW DENSITY HIGH PERMEAIILITY ZONE (WETSEAM}

(B) PROFILE ON CENTERLINE CREST
OF DAM (LOOKING DOWNSTREAM)

FIG. 1 TETON DAM

The acceptability M a proposed failure mechanism can be judged by the extent to which it
explains the following observed facts:

Davidson personally observed the floor of the
left key trench after it was exposed~ he
affirms that no open joints were visible in the
floor of the trench. Other Bureau personnel
that were onsite confirm this view. There were
cracks through which seepage could occur, but
the openings were hardly larger than those of
an acceptable filter. As the evidence is
overwhelming that there were no open ~oints in
the bottom of the left key trench, an as conditions in the right key trench were stated to
be better than in the left (see depositions by
Bureau field personnel; IRG 1977, pp. C.-14 to
C-22), the IP's postulate that failure was initiated by piping through open joints at the
bottom of the key trench, and the consequent
development of an erosion tunnel across the
base of the key trench fill, is not supported
by existing data.

1. Failure occurred at the right abutment
only. Excavation at the left abutment
disclosed no evidence that failure bj internal erosion was imminent, or that piping had
occurred to any extent; yet the size· and
frequency of open joints in the rock were as
severe at the left abutment key trench as
they were at the right. Thus, some other
weakness must have existed at the right
abutment that was not present at the left.
None of the failure mechanisms postulated
thus far have attempted to identify the
nature of this weakness.
2. Failure occurred in an extremely short
period of time. The dam was breached in
less than 50 days after the reservoir first
reached El. 5200, where failure is befi"evea
to have been initiated. It is likely that
the reservoir was at an elevation sufficient
to induce piping for only a few days
(perhaps only hours) prior to failure.
Thus, an explanation for the cause of
failure must include features that would
permit the demise of the dam to occur so
rapidly.

Open joints certainly existed in the upstream
and downstream walls of the key trench.
.
Cracking caused~ifferential strains within
the core material filling the key trench could
readily develop into erosion channels across
the key trench fill leading to rapid failure of
the dam. However, careful examination of the
slopes of the two abutments and key trenches,
of the relative overall quality of the embankment constructed at the two locations, and of
the potential for Jnequal loading due to different construction sequences (or to seismic

Previously postulated failure mechanisms will
now be examined in the light of the two criteria listed above.
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activity) did not disclose any reason to support a greater tendency for differential
settlement at the right vs. the left abutment.
As "no cracks attributable to differential
settlement of the embankment were found during
the left embankment excavation" (IRG, 1980,
p. 7-1), it is very unlikely that this mechanism was a contributing cause of failure.

the seal between the casings was broken.
Later, a new inner casing was set and
plugged, but atte~pts to extend the hole
below El. 5129 resulted in caving and
sloughing into the hole with mud and muddy
water noted to El. 5159. The IP concluded
that fracturing had occurred when borehole
water was first 1ost at El. 5212 and used a
fracture head of 101 ft to back-calculate
the stress-strain parameters in the finite
element analysis.
During excavation of the left abutment remnant in 1977, no trace was found of the
3,000 gal of water pumped into hole HF-5
between El. 5212 and 5163. No fracture
plane was found at the elevation of first
water loss into the hole. In the light of
this hindsight, there is no evidence to support the fracture head adopted to backcalculate stress-strain parameters for the
soil. Thus the reliability of all further
analyses using these parameters is open to
serious question.

Subsequent to the failure, an open joint (No.
172) was mapped striking diagonally across the
key trench floor between Sta. 14+64 and 14+83
(IP, 1976, p. E-7). In this zone, much of
the grout cap had been removed by the enormous
flow of water that ensued. Because inspectors had reported that open joints in the
floor of the key trench had been sealed, we
believe that the seal in joint No. 172 was
similarly removed.
Hydraulic fracturing (HF) is an alternate way
in which cracks could develop in the key trench
fi 11. The Independent Panel argued that this
mechanism of failure was plausible on the
following grounds:

2. Finite element (FE) analyses were made
to determine the corresponding stress
distribution in the embankment. Soil
stress-strain parameters were selected which
would correctly predict the result of the
borehole HF tests.

2. A two-dimensional FE analysis was performed with soil properties assumed to be
isotropic. Considering the steepness of the
abutment walls, the anisotropic nature of
compacted clay, and the sensitivity of
calculated lateral stresses to values of
Poisson's ratio, there was little reason to
place much credence in the results of the
FE analysis. This is especially true since
the calculated fracture pressure for
hole HF-7 was 6.4 ksf while, in fact, in the
only hole to be drilled and tested without
incident, hydraulic fractu~ing did not occur
at a water pressure of 7.8 ksf.

3. The parameters derived in this manner
were then used in FE analyses to evaluate
the stress distribution in the dam section
where it was deduced failure had occurred
and thereby assess the possibility that HF
could cause cracks to develop in the core of
the dam due to water pressure on the
upstream face.

While the IP pointed out the limitations of the
analysis and stated that "the criterion of initiation of hydraulic fracturing utilized herein
may require modification," it seems that, even
at the time, there was at least as much reason
to question the viability of this mechanism of
failure as there wa$ to cite it as a prime
candidate.

1. HF tests were performed in drill holes
made into the unfailed portion of the left
embankment remnant to determine the water
pressures required to cause fracturing.

On this basis, the Panel concluded that HF was
among the three most plausible mechanisms of
failure. We disagree with the basis for this
conclusion, for the following reasons:

In retrospect, careful and detailed examination
of the excavations at the left embankment remn~nt disclosed no evidence of hydraulic fracturing- in the sense envisioned in the IP
report - due to pressure from the reservoir*.
Unless it can be shown why hydraulic fracturing
should occur at the right abutment and not at
the left the sudden formation of vertical
cracks by hydraulic fracturing, that would progress rapidly to form 'COntinuous channels from
the upstream to the downstream walls of the
key trench, should not be considered a pl ausi -·
ble mechanism of failure.

1. In October-November 1976 the IP caused
three holes to be drilled in the left
embankment remnant for HF testing. One hole
(HF-6) was abandoned due to difficulties in
drilling; in the second hole (HF-7) hydrofracturing did not occur even when the
casing was filled to its top elevation of
5318.5 (maximum reservoir elevation was
5302). The difficulties encountered with
the t h i r d h o 1e ( HF- 5) h ave been de t a i 1 e d. by
Davidson (1978). Drilling started with a
rock bit and clear water at the location
shown i n F i g. 1. At a depth of 101 feet
(El. 5212) all drill water was lost.
Drilling continued for another 49 ft; during
this drilling, 3,000 gal of water were
pumped in within an hour with no return. An
inner casing was placed and the annular
space was sealed at the bottom for approximately 2 ft with cement grout. A smaller
rock bit and air pressure were then used to
extend the hole another 40 ft, at which time

* Cracks due to drilling using air pressure of
up to 150 lb/in2 were indeed observed, but no
fractures due to water pressure from the reserv o. i r were found .
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occurring was a serious design error at Teton
Dam.

Findings of the Interior Review Group, 1977
In their first report, the IRG (1977) stated:

In the 1977 report, the IRG recommended additional investigations of the left abutment and
embankment remnant. It was stated:

"The most probable physical mode of failure
was cracking of the impervious core material
either due to hydraulic fracturing or differential settlement within the embankment
that allowed the initiation of erosion."

"Physical conditions on the left abutment
are very similar to those of the right abutment. An investigation of the embankment
and embankment foundation contact surface
will be made by a means that will permit
visual inspection."

This finding is identical to the second conclusion reached by the Independent Panel; the factors mitigating against its validity have
already been discussed in detail. The IRG went
on to say:

"The investigation will be primarily to
search for cracks in the remaining left
embankment and to find evidences of erosion
of the zone 1 [core] and the rock surface."

"Somewhat les~ probable is the concept that
damaging seepage started at the contact of
zone 1 (impervious core) material and the
rock surface. The open fractures in the
abutment foundation rock allowed direct
access by reservoir water to the impervious
core on the upstream side of the key trench.
Any water flowing through the impervious
core could exit int~ open fractures on the
downstream side of the key trench."

"Further in situ stress investigations are
planned."
To the credit of the Bureau, these recommendations were fully implemented. Over
880,000 yd3 of embankment were carefully excavated and visually examined, in open exca~a
tion, test pits, trenches, adits~ and bor1ngs.
Additional hydrofracturing, in s1tu permeability, and field density and moist~re tests
were carried out; an instrument to mon1tor
foundation rock rebound was installed; record
samples (including cubic ft blocks) were
obtained for further testing in the laboratory;
and additional core drilling was done in the
right and left abutment key trenches to ~xplore
further the condition of the grout curta1n. It
was probably the most comprehensive postconstruction investigation ever made on a civil
engineering structure, whether failed o~
unfailed. The results were documented 1n a
second report by the IRG (IRG, 1980). The main
findings were:

The exact meaning of the above quote is not
clear. Water "flowing through the impervious
core" could include seepage at the interface
between the key trench floor and the fill.
Considering the relatively even surface of the
floor and grout cap in the area wh~re fail~r~
was initiated, the special compact1on spec1f1ed
at this juncture, and statements by construction supervision staff that this aspect of the
specifications was faithfully executed (which
is borne out by construction photographs),
piping along the fill/rock interface should not
occur unless the hydraulic gradient was abnormally high. At El. 5200, approximately where
failure is believed to have been initiated, the
head at maximum reservoir level was 103 ft,
corresponding to a maximum hydraulic gradient
of approximately 3 to 4 across the base of the
key trench. Many dams have withstood gradients
of this order at the core/rock interface
without incident.

1. The floor of the left key trench was
relatively smooth and free of open joints.
2. The bottom 12 to 18 inches of key trench
fill upstream of the grout cap were nearly
saturated. Fill in contact with the foundation downstream of the grout cap generally
was not saturated, but several. locations
were found where upstream to downstream
penetration of water had occurred across the
grout cap. No locations were found where
the nearly saturated fill extended across
the full width of the key trench floor.
[The assessments were based on subjective
determination of moisture content and on
measured water contents and calculated
degrees of saturation. In general, it was
difficult to distinguish a "wetting surface"
visually.]

Water flowing through the key trench fill from
open joints on the upstream wall at full reservoir head to open joints in the downstream wall
could, of course, start erosion into the
downstream joints. However,· excavation of the
left abutment key trench diiclosed no instance
in which flow had progressed much more than
half way across the key trench fill. Again,
unless it can be shown that conditions in the
right abutment key trench were different than
at the left, it is unlikely that this mechanism
initiated the failure. It may be argued that,
eventually, seepage would occur through the key
trench fill. Piping could then start at joints
in the downstream wall and progressively erode
a channel extending to the upstream face, which
would allow further erosion to take place
rapidly. This could be true, although it has
been demonstrated (Wittke, 1984) that piping
into open rock joints can be a slow process,
and may have provided sufficient warning for
remedial measures to prevent breaching of the
dam. Nevertheless, we fully concur that
failure to seal open joints in the rock and to
provide filters to prevent piping from

3. While grout from rock surface treatment
was found in some of the joints in the left
key trench walls, mostly in the downstream
wall, many open joints were also encountered. One such joint in the downstream
wall was nearly vertical, 3ft high, and
about 6 in wide.
4. In compliance with the specifications,
fill material had been compacted into open
joints in the trench walls. Material within
joints at the upstream wall face became
1106
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wetted with reservoir water and was loose.
[However, we are aware of no case where
sloughed material was found penetrating more
than a few inches into the main body of the
fill.]

The "Wet Seams"
The characteristics of the wet seams most relevant to this discussion are:
a. Geometr~. The thickness of a wet seam
never excee ed one loose lift (8 in +);
usually, they were 4 in or less in thickness. What was initially thought to be a
nearly continuous single wet seam was
actually multiple wet seams, localized
pockets, and discontinuous lenses. Association of wet seams with variations in the
compaction process is inescapable.

5. Joints in the left abutment rock outside
of the key trench were generally open but no
fill erosion into these joints was observed.
6. Nineteen core holes were pressure tested
with water to determine the tightness of the
grout curtain. Water losses indicated that
the grout curtain was of adequate quality to
control seepage losses, but it was not
impervious enough to prohibit flow from
occurring.

b. Moisture/Density. The in situ water
content ranged from 22.3 to 33.0 percent,
average 28.0 percent, 9.4 percent above the
average for all zone 1 fill. The in situ
dry unit weight ranged from 82.3 to
96.5 lb/ft3, average 90.3 lb/ft3,
8.8 lb/ft3 less than the average for all
zone 1 fill. The Proctor optimum moisture
content and dry unit weight were 3.1 percent
above the average OMC (19.7 percent) and
5.3 lb/ft3 below the average maximum density
(101.1 lb/ft3) for all zone 1 fill. These
results show that:
In situ moisture contents are far above
optimum, a~d the average is more than
5 percent wet of optimum, although the
frequency distribution for zone 1 fill
(IRG, 1980, p. 4-22) shows that virtually 100 percent of the fill was
placed drier than 1 percent wet of
optimum. Therefore, the high water
contents must be due to post-placement
infiltration.

7. Three additional holes were drilled for
hydraulic fracturing testing using air-foam
drilling. Great care was exercised during
drilling, placement of casing, and sealing
of the test sections. In all three cases,
the holes were filled with water to the top
of the casing but no hydraulic fracturing
was observed; at this time the water level
in HF-11 (in the key trench) was 18ft above
the reservoir elevation at failure, while in
holes HF-14 and HF-15 (in the center of the
emQankment) it was 30 ft above this reservolr level.
8. No erosion of fill was observed either
above or below the grout cap.
9. No visible cracks, except those clearly
associated with hydraulic fracture tests
were observed in the fill. No pipi~ any
kind was observed.
It is worthwhile to pause and remind ourselves
that the primary purpose of this massive additional investigation was "to search for cracks
in the remaining left embankment and to find
evidences of erosion channels through the core
or at the contact of the zone 1 and the rock
surface" (IRG, 1977, p. 105). In fact, absolutely nothing of this nature was uncovered.
However, on October 5, 1977, a surprising and
heretofore unobserved phenomenon was discovered: a soi 1 layer in zone 1 was noticed to
be seeping water at Sta. 24+50, 150 ft upstream
from the dam centerline and near El. 5113.
T~ere had been no awareness of extremely wet
f1ll as the removal of material had proceeded
through the elevation of the seepage zone
between the embankment remnant and the abutment. During subsequent field investigations,
nu~erous such seepage zones were encountered,
wh1ch were termed "wet seams." The discovery
of the wet seams on the left side of the
embankment led to speculation that a similar
s~am on the righ~ side may have been responSlble for the fa1lure of the dam. In view of
this possibility, a careful study to determine
the cause, character, location, and significance of the wet seams was immediately undertaken by the IRG. It is not feasible to
present herein even a brief review of all the
major findings; hence, we must content ourse~ves with a discussion only of those features
wh1ch led us to propose our version of the most
likely mechanism of fail~re.

In situ dry unit weights and Proctor
optimum densities are very low in comparison with the average of zone 1
fill. This suggests that the properties of the material in the wet seams
are different from the average, but as
the high water contents are due to
post-placement infiltration, other
layers with properties similar to those
in the wet seams could exist that have
not yet been infiltrated and, therefore, would not appear as wet seams.
Thus, it is not necessary for a wet
seam to have been in contact with the
rock of the right abutment. What is
relevant is the possibility that
material similar to that in the wet
seams could have been compacted in the
right abutment key trench.
If the compaction characteristics of
the material in the wet seam were
misjudged and thought to be more
like the average of material in zone 1,
the placement water content could
actually be much drier than the
3.5 percent below OMC permitted by the
specifications.
The result is the extreme likelihood that
layers of silt compacted very dry of optimum
were incorporated in the dam, at the left as
well as the right abutment. This is clearly
indicated in Fig. 2, which shows that
1107
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samples of the Teton silt can be compacted
to D-ratios >95 percent at water contents
more than 8 percent dry of optimum, while
the Nebraskan silts fall below D = 95 percent when the water content is 3.4 percent
dry of optimum.

...

-r

1000

~

-\.

::: 500

c. Permeability. Horizontal and vertical
permeability tests were conducted on samples
from hand-cut blocks taken from zone 1 fill.
Fig. 3 shows the relation between average
horizontal permeability and dry density
obtained from these tests. Typica11y, permeabilities in the wet seams are an order of
magnitude higher than outside the wet seams.
The IRG attributed these large differences
in permeability primarily to differences in
dry density and not to other physical, chemical, or mineralogical differences. We
interpret it to mean that the wet seam
samples not only had lower densities but
also were compacted initially well on the
dry side of Proctor optimum moisture
content.
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SYMBOL SAMPLE
NO.

LOCATION

d. Collapse Potential. Three specimens
from a wet seam sack sample were compacted
to approximately 90 lb/ft3 (93 percent of
Proctor maximum) at moisture contents 0.4,
1.1, and 3.5 percent dry of Proctor OMC.
After curing they were consolidated rapidly
without wetting to 80 lb/in2, the approximate preconsolidation pressure of block
samples from the wet seams. The 80-lb/in2
pressure was maintained for 24 hours before
the samples were wetted. Fig. 4 shows the
additional compression, or "collapse," on
wetting. The 2.6 percent collapse was considered excessive and undesirable, as it was
thought it would probably lead to cracking
in the relatively brittle zone 1 fill.
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test data indicates the possible occurrence
of embankment stresses low enough for
hydraulic fracturing to occur."

COLLAPSE ON WETTING
RATIO• UNWETTED COMPRESSION -percent
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Arguments supporting our belief that neither
conclusion 1, nor cracking due to hydraulic
fracturing are likely mechanisms ~f failure
have already been presented. Although we
believed that the dam failed too rapidly for
the mechanism described in conclusion 2 to have
occurred, it "rang a bell" which ultimately led
to our explanation of the failure mechanism.
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Findings of Seed and Duncan (1982)
COLLAPSE RATIO

The retrospective review by Seed and Duncan
(1982) included several important contributions, foremost among which was the review of
additional hydro-fracturing studies conducted
at the University of California (Jaworski,
1979; Jaworski, Duncan, and Seed, 1981). Among
the "useful tentative hypotheses" proposed,
relating to the occurrence of hydraulic fracturing were the following:
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"Hydraulic fracturing is promoted by, and
may, in fact, require the presence of a
discontinuity, such as a b-orehole, an
existing crack, or loose soil adjacent to
a rock joint, within which the water
pressure can act to create tensile
stresses through a wedging action in the
soil."
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"Hydraulic separation can occur at an
interface between soil and an adjacent
dissimilar material such as concrete or
rocK as soon as the water pressure
reaches the same magnitude as the normal
stress across the interface" [assuming no
adhesion between the soil and rock].

4

REDUCTION IN VOLUME ON
WETTING - percent
FIG. 4
PERCENT VOLUME REDUCTION AND COLLAPSE
RATIO VS DEVIATION FROM OPTIMUM MOISTURE
CONTENT, SAMPLE FROM .. WET SEAM

[As tests showed that the rate at which
the water pressure is increased, as well
as the size of the zone within which
stress redistribution and changes in
water content occur, have a profound
effect on the fracturing pressure.]

Conclusions of the IRG, 1980
In 1980, the IRG concluded that the discovered
conditions in zone 1 fill supported the
following physical modes by which piping could
have been initiated:

" . . . thus, the pressures required to
cause fracturing during reservoir filling
may be different for a borehole test th~n
the water pressure application on the
core of a dam."

1. "Seepage of reservoir water along either
the fill/rock contact surface or near the
top of the grout curtain in the right key
trench, or

Seed and Duncan concluded:
"As a result of these studies it was
concluded that hydraulic fracturing could
occur in the key trenches under the seepage
and water pressure conditions existing at
the time of failure. However, it could only
occur in limited portions of the fill having
the right combination of

2. "Seepage of reservoir water through a
low density, high permeability lens located
within or adjacent to the right key trench."
These conclusions are drastically different
from the findings stated in the 1977 report and
is illustrative of the evolution in thinking
regarding the primary mechanisms of failure as
more data were developed and more time to study
all aspects of the failure became available.
Nevertheless, they went on to say:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

"No cracks associated with reservoir-induced
hydraulic fracturing or differential settlement within the embankment were discovered.
However, evaluation of hydraulic fracture

This may explain why failure occurred near
Station 15+00 and nowhere else."
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open rock joints
soi 1 type
location of joints in the key trench
outlet rock joints on the downstream
face
in-situ stress conditions.

Fig. 5. We appreciate that the data are insufficient to reach a definitive conclusion;
nevertheless, this remarkable result led us to
believe there is a high probability that a
continuous layer of high permeability was
constructed across the right key trench and not
across the left. However, as we have argued
before, this is not by itself sufficient to
explain the rapid demise of the dam because
(1) time is required for seepage t~ transit the
width of the key trench, and (2) due to the
relatively modest initial exit gradient, soil
would merely slough into an open joint on the
downstream wall and piping would only work its
way, slowly back to the upstream face. We
concluded that the combination of these two
effects would require much more time to fail
the dam than the limited number of days
(perhaps hours) in which the dam was breached.
It seemed necessary for the flow rate into a
downstream joint to be very high initially so
that sloughed soil would immediately be washed
out, thereby permitting a larger and larger
channel to form rapidly. Only a preformed
crack, or hydraulic fracturing, seemed to
satisfy this requirement. The dilemma posed by
this requirement remained unresolved for months
until, one day, Leonards recalled earlier studies on the collapse of compacted clays
(Leonards and Al tschaeffl, 1971). The brief
treatment of "col]apse potential" in the IRG
report (summarized in Fig. 4) came into focus,
and the additional reduction in normal stress
at the base of the key trench due to arching
that would accompany the collapse was realized.

It has already been pointed out that the rock
joints in the left abutment key trench were, if
anything, more open than on the right, and that
the geometries of the two key trenches were
essentially identical. No reason is given why
the soil type in the right abutment key trench
~hould be more susceptible to fracturing than
1n the left key trench. As no evidence of
hydraulic fracturing due to reservoir seepage
was found in the left abutment excavations, the
argument that it caused failure at the right
abutment is not supported by the existing data.
Seed and Duncan (1982) proposed three additional possibilities for the failure, all three
of which required
"water to flow, with accompanying erosion,
from an upstream open joint [in the floor of
the trench] along the base of the key
trench, over the 9rout cap and into a
downstream joint Lin the floor of the
trench] as illustrated in Fig • . • . "
stated previously, we believe the probabillty that such open joints existed in the floor
of the right key trench to be very remote-.---Seed and Duncan also offered a fourth potential
mechanism of failure:

~s

"The remote possibility that a wet seam
existed in the right abutment key trench
permitting seepage directly through the seam
and associated internal erosion."
This mechanism is similar to conclusion (2) in
the 1980 IRG report, except that the IRG did
not require that the low density-high permeability layer initially be a wet seam. This
possibility will be discussed later.

ZONE 1 FILL
SECTION AT
14+00
I

Note:~ of key
trench is not
parallel to dam axis,
All control 1 tests were tn
.....___::he key tr;[ench fi 11.

PROPOSED FAILURE MECHANISM
The basic requirements of a viable mechanism to
explain the failure of Teton Dam are reiterated
as follows:
1. A weakness with respect to seepage erosion must have existed in the right abutment
and not at the left, and

................

................
3

7

/

/

te ze~~ __:L_
--.s--.6~.-_ _ _ .-..!~ _.!Q.

2. The opportunity must exist to promote
failure by seepage erosion in a matter of a
few days after the reservoir reached an elevation sufficient to initiate the erosive
action.

\.
20

As soon as it was recognized that a high permeability layer could have been built completely across the right key trench fill and
not across the left, it immediately became
apparent that this could be checked using the
records of compaction control tests. The data
were computerized and printouts of the
moisture/density test results, station by station, were obtained. Data at locations
corresponding to the key trench fill, on both
abutments, were then plotted for each 100-ft
tnterval. At only one locale did the data
suggest a continuous stratum of soil compacted
on the dry side of optimum, which - notably turned out to be 14+00, ·as illustrated in

o

/
/POTENTIAL:
40 \...... _ _ / COLLAPSE
ZONE

\.

20

160

TEST DEV. OMC
NO
%
1
0.9dry
2
1.5dry
1.5dry
3
"1 .OW&t
4
5
2.2dry

rd

TEST DEV.OMC rd
pet
pcf
NO
%
95.4
2.0dry 98.6
6
96.6
O.Sdry 189.8
7
1.6dry 96.7
97.4
8
106..4
2.2dry 92.3
9
100.!i 10
1.4weJ 103.3

FIG. 5 COMPACTION CONTROL TESTS RESULTS OI::TWEEN
STA.13+90 AND STA.14+40, AND EL.5184 AND EL. 5118
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/

........

50 feet - from the drill hole.*

Thus,

SUBSIDENCE OR "COLLAPSE" OF A PERMEABLE
DRY-SIDE COMPACTED LAYER SPANNING THE WIDTH
OF THE KEY TRENCH ON T~E RIGHT ABUTMENT,
PERMITTED HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (OR
SEPARATION) TO OCCUR IN THE KEY TRENCH FILL
THEREBY ALLOWING FLOW FROM OPEN JOINTS IN
THE UPSTREAM WALL (WITH ACCESS TO THE
RESERVOIR) TO OPEN JOINTS IN THE DOWNSTREAM
WALL,

LESSONS LEARNED
Following their retrospective review, Seed and
Duncan (1982) listed 11 lessons to be learned
from the Teton Dam failure. We basically agree
with all of them, especially with the principle
of "mUltiple 1 i nes of defense" advocated by
Karl Terzaghi and Arthur Casagrande. Failure
to adopt this approach, especially for the conditions extant at Teton, was a serious design
error. The principle also underscores the
importance of understanding the actual mechanisms of failure, which provide the only
rational means of assessing benefit/cost ratios
of different proposed "lines of defense."
Moreover, they may avoid building in features
that, for example, may be conducive to
hydraulic fracturing, or to other undesirable
conditions, even if measures to prevent seepage erosion are provided for.

is proposed as a failure mechanism that is
fully supported by all the existing data.
ONLY THE COMBINATION OF A PERMEABLE LAYER
COLLAPSING ON SATURATION, AND OPEN JOINTS IN
THE WALLS OF THE KEY TRENCH WITH ACCESS TO THE
RESERVOIR, COULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY DISCONTINUITY AND SUFFICIENT REDUCTION IN STRESS ON
HORIZONTAL PLANES TO INDUCE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND RESULT IN SO RAPID A FAILURE OF THE
DAM.

To the 11 lessons cited by Seed and Duncan, we
add the following:

We immediately decided to test the validity of
our proposal with large-scale model studies
in the laboratory but, alas, the necessary
resources were not available to us. However,
the experiments described below were conducted.

I. Samples of Teton silt can be compacted
to compaction ratios greater than 95 percent
at water contents more than 8 percent dry of
their Proctor optimum water contents; hence,
it would be particularly difficult to judge
the acceptability of field compaction. by
visual inspection. Therefore, the frequency
of compaction control tests should have been
higher than usual. In the future, the
"norms" for frequency of compaction control
tests should not be applied indiscriminately
to all soils.

As in previous collapse potential tests,
samples were compacted dry of optimum into consolidation rings. Compression of the samples
was measured, without wetting, up to a
pressure of 80 lb/in2. The samples were then
wetted; but, instead of allowing collapse to
occur, the stress reduction necessary to maintain approximately constant volume was
measured. Subsequently, collapse was allowed
to occur. The results are shown in table 1.
Thus, collapse of a dry-side compacted layer in
the kev trench fill at the right abutment would
reduce vertical stresses by soil arching and
promote hydraulic fracturing at th~ interface
with the stiff adjacent fill. We believe that
the interface between two soil layers with different permeabilities is a discontinuity along
which hydraulic fracturing can bccur, even if
it is not initially a minor principal plane.
This is-evidenced by the fact that hydraulic
fracturing due to drilling at high air
pressures caused onlt horizontal cracks to
develop at least 25t - and possibly more than

II. Considering the seriousness of the
potential damage that could result, the difficulty of recognizing by visual inspection
that something is amiss, and the inevitable
occasional departures from the specifications associated with large construction
operations, specifying dry side compaction
(as low as 3.5 percent dry of OMC at Teton)
should be viewed with great caution.
* After our tests had been initiated, we became
aware of a draft report (Johnson a~d Palmerton,
1977) reviewing Appendix D of the Independent
Panel's 1976 Report. Therein i t was stated:
"If an abnormally dry layer or layers of
core material extended across the core
trench, the material would consolidate, if
saturated, much more than surrounding
material. This may have resulted in arching
at higher elevations and possibly in horizontal channels. The most likely failure
process would involve also hydraulic fracturing, since hydraulic fracturing and local
volume decrease would each promote the
other."
Apart from the requirement that the collapsing
layer initially must have a much higher permeability than the adjacent fill, to provide
the necessary discontinuity for hydraulic fracturing to occur, these statements are similar
to the conclusions we reached following more
than 2 years of painstaking efforts.
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Table 1.

Results of "Collapse" tests
Peori an
silt'
Nebraska*
s amp 1e
60N-642

Teton Dam
"wet seam"
sample
51B-328

100.0

75.0

10.0

N. p.

105.2
18.5

97.0
22.0

97.0
13.5
92.2

92.5
17.0
95.4

3.3

2.9

3.9

0.3

118.0

11.0

39.0

15.4

1.4

0.2

36.0

67.0

soils, there is still much to learn about
(a) the mechanics of the field compaction
process, including the manner in which
sheepsfoot rollers compact silts and silty
clays dry of optimum; (b) the differences in
compacted properties -especially optimum
moisture content, permeability, and
compressibility- between field and laboratory compacted soils; and (c) the mechanics
of hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic fracturing is, potentially, so damaging a process that it clearly merits further
intensive study.

Inherent Characteristics
Passing No. 200 mesh
sieve, percent
Plasticity index,
percent

*

V. A methodology for investigating failures
(Leonards, 1979) was applied to Teton Dam.
The search for a mechanism of failure continued until one was found compatible with
all the known facts, which, in turn,
suggested specific investigations that
otherwise would not have been thought of.
This resulted in: (a) the discovery that
Teton silt had unusual compaction characteristics dry of optimum (Fig. 2); (b) a
directed search of compaction control
records to identify the potential existence
of continuous layers in the key trenches
compacted dry of optimum (Fig 5); and (c)
special tests to measure the relief in
stress associated with collapse on wetting
(table 1).

Proctor Test
Max. dry density, lb/ft3
Opt. water content,
percent
Compaction Conditions
Dry density, lb/ft3
Water content, percent
Compaction (D) ratio,
percent
Axial Strain
Unwetted comgression
0-80 lb/in2, percent
Compression on wetting
at 80 lb/2, percent
Wetting to unwetted
compression, percent

VI. Each successive study of the Teton Dam
failure contributed to our understanding of
earth dam behavior. This demonstrates that
there is much to be gained from continued_
retrospective analyses of past failures, 1n
the light of current knowledge. It has been
shown that there is no reason to be complacent about the lessons learned from past
investigations of failures (Leonards, 1982).
A National Agency possessing (among other
attributes) the expertise and resources for
such continued studies would be of great
benefit to the civil engineering profession
and to the public at large.

"Restrained" Test
Stress reduction on
wetting, percent
Axial strain during
"restraint," percent**
"Restraint" strain/
wetting strain, percent
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III. Variations in the properties of compacted embankments are generally larger than
those commonly anticipated. It is essential
that steps be taken in design and construction practices not so much to reduce these
variations greatly- which would be very
expensive - but to identify potential
problems and insure that layers with adverse
properties do not have sufficient continuity
to be troublesome. At Teton it was most
likely a continuous layer of silt compacted
in the key trench well dry of optimum; at
Lake Shelbyvill~. it was established that a
thin weak seam of more highly plastic clay
was largely responsible for an upstream
slope failure shortly after the dam was
topped out (Humphrey and Leonards, 1984).
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